University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law
Program Faculty Publications

Law, College of

2009

Europe and the 'Resolution Revolution': 'European' Legal
Approaches to Privacy and Their Relevance for Space Remote
Sensing Activities
Frans G. von der Dunk
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, fvonderdunk2@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons

von der Dunk, Frans G., "Europe and the 'Resolution Revolution': 'European' Legal Approaches to Privacy
and Their Relevance for Space Remote Sensing Activities" (2009). Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications
Law Program Faculty Publications. 35.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw/35

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law Program Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Published in the Annals of Air and Space Law (2009) 34.
Copyright 2009, McGill University School of Law. Used by permission.

EUROPE AND THE 'RESOLUTION REVOLUTION':
'EUROPEAN' LEGAL APPROACHES TO PRIVACY AND THEIR
RELEVANCE FOR SPACE REMOTE SENSING ACTIVITIES
by
Frans G. von der Dunk!

SYNOPSIS
SYNOPSIS ..................................................................................................... 809
ABSTRACT/RESUME ................................................................................ 810
I.

SPACE REMOTE SENSING, PRIVACY PROTECTION
ISSUES AND THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT ............................. 811

II.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND PRIVACY: THE
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH.................................................. 814

III.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND PRIVACY: THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH ........................................................... 820

IV.

THE BASELINE REGIME FOR THE EUROPEAN
UNION: THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE ................... 824
A.
THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE:
SCOPE, OBJECTIVES AND DEFINITIONS ................ 824
B.
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE
DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE ON DATA
HANDLING ..................................................................... 826

V.

THE ELABORATIONS: EU INSTITUTIONS,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND EXTRA-EU EFFECTS ........ 831
A.
REGULATION 45/2001 – EU INSTITUTIONS
INVOLVED IN DATA HANDLING ............................ 831
B.
DIRECTIVES 97/66 AND 2002/58 –
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INVOLVED IN
DATA HANDLING ........................................................ 835

! Professor of Space Law, Lincoln, College of Law, University of Nebraska. He is also
Director of the recently established Black Holes BV, Consultancy in space law and policy,
based in Leiden. Prior to the foregoing, he held the positions of Co-Director, and
subsequently Director of Space Law Research at the International Institute of Air and Space
Law at Leiden University since 1990.

-809-

810

ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW

C.
VI.

VOL. XXXIV

DECISIONS 2001/497 AND 2002/16 – EXTRAEU EFFECTS OF DATA HANDLING.......................... 840

CONCLUDING REMARKS ......................................................... 841

ABSTRACT
With the increasing general availability of very high resolution (VHR) satellite
remote sensing data, issues of potential invasion of personal spheres of privacy will
become ever more important. As of yet, there is no international law providing for a
clear-cut regime balancing the freedom of information, including information gathering,
with the rights of individual persons to remain free from interference with their privacy.
The latter issues therefore essentially can be tackled only at a national level, with the
obvious disadvantage that any regulation remains principally limited in scope to the
national jurisdiction concerned.
Also at the European level this essentially holds true, although two separate
developments are making considerable inroads into this situation. On the one hand, by
means of the European Convention on Human Rights, which does recognize a human
right to privacy, an overarching regime has been created that largely limits individual
member states of the Council of Europe in their discretion to deal with that right as they
see fit.
On the other hand, from a perspective of prevention of undue distortion of the
Internal Market through major variations in the extent to which (the application of)
privacy laws might result in obstacles to the free flow of information within the European
Union, a body of EC law is evolving which harmonizes the applicable laws to a
considerable extent.
This paper analyzes both developments, and represents an effort to relate them to
each other with a view in particular as to how they might impact satellite remote sensing
operations, once these would actually come to be seen as infringing personal privacy. Its
final conclusion is that, indeed, the combination of those two European legal approaches
to privacy leads to a sensible compromise on handling the potential effects on privacy
flowing from the ‘resolution revolution’ in satellite remote sensing data.
RÉSUMÉ
La disponibilité accrue de données télédétection très haute résolution renforce le
problème de l'empiètement sur le droit à la vie privée. Jusqu'a maintenant, aucune loi
internationale n'avait établi de distinction juridique permettant de mettre en balance les
intérêts concurrents de la liberté de l'accès à l'information et de la collecte d'informations
avec le droit de l'individu au respect de sa vie privée. Par conséquent, les tribunaux
devront trouver des
solutions
aux
problèmes
juridiques
en
droit
domestique, avec pour inconvénient majeur, un champ d'application restreint à celui de
la loi étatique.
Ce problème existe en Europe comme ailleurs, mais la situation tend quelque peu
à s’éclaircir grâce à deux tendances. Premièrement la Convention européenne des droits
de l'homme reconnaît le droit à la vie privée, et le régime obligatoire de cette Convention
limite considérablement la marge de manœuvre des États Membres du Conseil de
l'Europe dans leur interprétation de ce droit. Deuxièmement, afin d'éviter la distorsion
du marché interne qui pourrait résulter de l'application de différentes lois domestiques
sur l'accès à l'information, le droit européen est en train d'harmoniser considérablement
les règles applicables.
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Cet article analyse ces deux développements et tente de discerner la relation entre
eux, surtout pour déterminer l'effet sur les opérations de télédétection par satellite
lorsqu'il est établi que ces opérations empiètent sur le droit à la vie privée. La conclusion
de l'article est que ces deux approches juridiques européennes représentent un compromis
intéressant pour les effets potentiels sur la vie privée des données télédétection très haute
résolution.

I.

SPACE
REMOTE
PROTECTION ISSUES
CONTEXT

SENSING,
AND THE

PRIVACY
EUROPEAN

O

ne of the most important recent global developments in space
activity is that triggered by the increasing generation of very
high resolution (VHR) satellite remote sensing data. Its
worldwide availability, driven by Google Earth and its equivalents (for
obvious commercial reasons) making crucial use of modern
telecommunication infrastructure such as the Internet, helps to spur on a
revolution in satellite imagery and data acquisition. These developments
manifest themselves in the rapidly increasing possibilities now available
to individuals to, potentially, monitor and intrude in on other
individuals' private lives, and the concurrent growing interest of
commerce in such potential.
Personally, I received a forewarning of the potential impact of
such developments a number of years ago when a German businessman
approached me with his idea to offer certain mementoes for sale to
tourists leaving the peninsula of Mount Athos, a religious enclave within
Greece. The mementoes in question concerned satellite pictures of the
peninsula and its monasteries. He was, however, faced with a refusal by
the Greek authorities to permit him to sell such mementoes near the 'exit'
of Mount Athos since the intrusion upon the prevailing religious
atmosphere as per these 'satellite close-ups' was considered
unacceptable. He wondered whether such a prohibition was not in
violation of the freedom of space activities, in particular remote sensing,
as he understood it to be enshrined within the Outer Space Treaty1 and
international law.2
1 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), done 27
January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410;
UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967), in particular Art. I
which states amongst other things: "Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any
kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law".
2 In regard of remote sensing, the freedom of using outer space within the limits of
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The answer, of course, was both yes: the freedom of remote
sensing prevented the Greek government from prohibiting the generation
of those satellite pictures of Mount Athos (at least under international
law – in other words, as long as the relevant operator was not Greek or
operating from Greek territory); and no: there was nothing legally
incorrect with the prohibition imposed by the Greek authorities on the
distribution such data within Greece, as this was comprehensively
subsumed under the sovereignty of Greece. As such, Sovereign
competencies would certainly extend to any efforts to preserve the
virtual integrity of the monasteries in terms of such intrusion, and to
consider such rights to virtual integrity more important than relevant
business interests.
It therefore seems that while international law positively
stimulates the worldwide flow of information and data as freely as
possible, national law is then often called upon to try and preserve the
interests of individual people or entities to have information and data
pertaining to them less freely circulated. This dichotomy could only rise
to pre-eminence with the 'resolution revolution', since this revolution, for
the first time, spawned data of such high resolution that privacy can
become fundamentally challenged in the process. In the above instance,
the privacy was of a larger-than-individual nature - but the next step to
intrusion in personal privacy is only a small one.3
As revolutions are wont to do, this one has to some extent started
to eat its own children. The CEO of Google Earth was not very pleased,
to put it mildly, when he found his mansion including swimming pool
and other edifices to be easily and rapidly pointed out on the Internet,
using Google data. Recently, whether as a consequence of this 'event' or
not, Google Earth announced its general interest in cooperating with
relevant authorities to ensure that a correct balance would be struck
between privacy concerns and any commercial interests involved. This
expression of interest was clarified as being acceptable only with the
international law has taken on the particular shape of freedom of information-gathering
from space and the distribution of such data. This freedom is only marginally limited by
the provision of Principle XII of the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from
Outer Space (hereafter Resolution 41/65), UNGA Res. 41/65, of 3 December 1986; UN Doc.
A/AC.105/572/Rev.1, at 43; 25 ILM 1334 (1986); that "As soon as the primary data and the
processed data concerning the territory under its jurisdiction are produced, the sensed
State shall have access to them on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost
terms".
3 See e.g. R. Purdy, 'Satellites: A New Era for Environmental Compliance', (2006) 3:5
Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law, 407-8; 412-3.
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least possible interference with opportunities to generate, distribute and
use relevant data.
Regardless of these Google Earth-centered events, it will be clear
that the underlying developments in this area do draw issues of the
protection of privacy of individuals into the picture. This paper
addresses the issue from a particular European vantage point because, in
Europe, the dichotomy between international law and national law is to
some extent bridged by legal developments at an intermediate level.
In this respect, it is important to note that when it comes to
'European legal approaches' to privacy protection in law, and their
potential or actual impact upon space-based remote sensing activities,
one should look elsewhere than space lawyers would perhaps, at first
instance, be inclined to do. The 'Europe' in question is not that of the
European Space Agency (ESA), as this is an intergovernmental
organization created to pool the financial and technical resources of its
member states for the purpose of space activities, and which does not
seek to exercise any legal or regulatory control over such space activities,
whether public or private.4 Neither is it the 'Europe' of EUTELSAT5 (even
4

ESA was established by means of the Convention for the Establishment of a European Space
Agency, Paris, done 30 May 1975, entered into force 30 October 1980; 14 ILM 864 (1975),
which lists, in Art. II, as the primary objectives of such establishment: "to provide for and to
promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European States in space
research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their being used for
scientific purposes and for operational space applications systems, (a) by elaborating and
implementing a long-term European space policy, by recommending space objectives to
the Member States, and by concerting the policies of the Member States with respect to
other national and international organizations and institutions; (b) by elaborating and
implementing activities and programmes in the space field; (c) by coordinating the
European space programme and national programmes, and by integrating the latter
progressively and as completely as possible into the European space programme, in
particular as regards the development of applications satellites; (d) by elaborating and
implementing the industrial policy appropriate to its programme and by recommending a
coherent industrial policy to the Member States".
5 EUTELSAT was originally established as an intergovernmental organization by means of
the Convention Establishing the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT),
Paris, done 15 July 1982, entered into force 1 September 1985; Cmnd. 9069; Space Law – Basic
Legal Documents, C.II.1; for the purposes of "the design, development, construction,
establishment, operation and maintenance of the space segment of the European
telecommunications satellite system or systems. In this context, EUTELSAT shall have as its
prime objective the provision of the space segment required for international public
telecommunications services in Europe" (Art. III (a)). Meanwhile, EUTELSAT operations
have been commercialised, with a private operator Eutelsat being responsible for day-today management, operations, marketing and sales; cf. also Convention Establishing the
European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT), done 15 July 1982, entered
into force 1 September 1985, as amended 20 May 1999, amended version not yet entered
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before its recent privatization) as that organization essentially took over
European satellite communication infrastructure; or even of
EUMETSAT,6 which did the same for satellite-based meteorology. The
'Europe' that needs to concern us here is that of, on the one hand, the
Council of Europe, and, on the other hand, the European Community as
it constitutes the legally relevant part of the European Union.

II.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND PRIVACY: THE
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH

The Council of Europe is one of the oldest intergovernmental
organizations in Europe that sprung from the general desire to steer
away from the horrors of the Second World War. It was to establish an
international framework integrating several aspects of the member
states' national legal orders in order to ban the nationalism and
xenophobia largely considered responsible for those horrors. Its magnum
opus was the European Convention on Human Rights,7 serving as a
catalogue of fundamental human rights to counter any tendency to
permit the resurgence of such horrors.
The Council of Europe itself was established by means of the
Statute of the Council of Europe, drafted in 1949.8 Currently, it comprises
47 member states,9 and is thus considerably broader in terms of
membership than the European Union. All members of the Council of
Europe as a consequence of their membership automatically became
parties to the European Convention on Human Rights.
In the context of the Council of Europe, privacy has been logically
into force but applied provisionally 2 July 2001; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, C.II.1.
6 The intergovernmental organization EUMETSAT was established by means of the
Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), Geneva, done 24 May 1983, entered into force 19
June 1986; as amended 14 July 1994, entered into force 27 July 1994; Cmnd. 9483; Space Law
– Basic Legal Documents, C.III.1; 44 ZLW 68 (1995); in order "to establish, maintain and
exploit European systems of operational meteorological satellites, taking into account as far
as possible the recommendations of the World Meteorological Organization. A further
objective of EUMETSAT is to contribute to the operational monitoring of the climate and
the detection of global climatic changes" (Art. 2(1)).
7 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, done 4
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953; ETS No. 005. [European Convention on
Human Rights].
8 Statute of the Council of Europe, London, done 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August
1949; ETS No. 001.
9 See online: <http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe>. At the time of writing, there is
one applicant state as well as five observer states.
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approached and is treated, first and foremost, as a (rather fundamental)
human right. The principle does not attempt a balancing act between an
individual interest to remain free from intrusion and other (commercial)
interests in the widespread distribution and availability of personal and
personalized information.
To be precise, such a legal approach was not an exclusively
European one. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights,10
drafted in the UN context for more or less the same purposes and with
more or less the same approach, had included an Article 12 which
prohibited any arbitrary interference with privacy and called for its
protection by instruments of national (as well as international) law.11
The Universal Declaration was not a treaty with binding legal
force, although its high political and moral status, as well as the obvious
concerns for humanity behind it, caused it to be viewed by many as
representing, in many respects, customary international law and, in
some respects, even as jus cogens.12 Most of the Declaration's principles
were later elaborated upon in an international convention, the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 17 of this
Covenant, addressing the right to privacy, essentially replicates the
analogous provision in the Universal Declaration.13
Developments in Europe, however, were considerably more rapid,
as the European Convention on Human Rights was drafted as early as
1950, and was already in force in 1953. The Convention elaborated upon
the succinct statement of the human right to privacy in the Universal
Declaration. Article 8(1) posited the right to respect for private and
family life, home and correspondence, and Article 8(2) spelt out that
interference with the right to privacy by public authorities was
10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Paris, UN GA Res. 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948;
A/RES/217.
11 Art. 12 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, reads in full: "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."
12 See Art. 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, done 23 May 1969, entered
into force 27 January 1980; 1155 UNTS 331; UKTS 1980 No. 58; Cmnd. 4818; ATS 1974 No. 2; 8
ILM 679 (1969).
13 Art. 17, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, done 19 December
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976; 6 ILM 368 (1967); reads in full: "1. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
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permissible only in exceptional cases. Moreover, these exceptional
circumstances ought to be clearly outlined by the relevant national law
and exercised within the limits of such provisions. Such an approach was
of far greater precision than the Universal Declaration.14
Thus, whilst Article 12 of the Universal Declaration served as a
precursor to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
considerable differences exist.15 By way of an example further to the one
above, the European Convention does not expressly prohibit attacks on
honor and reputation, which the Universal Declaration by contrast does.
At the same time, the rights concerned are general and broad in scope,
and whilst the European Convention did not seek to provide exhaustive
definitions, interpretations were subsequently developed in case law, in
particular in the Pretty case.16
Also, the European Convention narrows down the scope of the
prohibition of interference to such interference by "public authority"
only.17 In other words: if the distribution of satellite data potentially
interfering with a person's privacy is carried out by a non-governmental
entity – for example a private entity acting for commercial reasons – no
violation of Article 8 would arise.
Essentially, this is where a 'paparazzi-problem' arises. The right to
recognition of privacy, expressed in Article 8(1) of the European
Convention, applies across the board. However, the specific prohibition
on interference with such privacy under Article 8(2) only applies to
governmental action, a prohibition limited furthermore by specifically
carved-out exceptions. In case relevant interference with privacy occurs
by private action, it would ultimately be up to the judge or court of the
concerned jurisdiction to decide whether the interference with the right
14 The full text of Article 8 runs as follows: "(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference
by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others."
15 See further in detail J. Velu, "The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right
to Respect for Private Life, the Home and Communications" in A.H. Robertson ed., Privacy
and Human Rights, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973) 14. [Velu].
16 Pretty v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 2346/02, Judgment of 29 April 2002)
[Pretty]; see further P. van Dijk et al, Eds., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on
Human Rights 4th ed., (Oxford/Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006) 664-5. [Van Dijk].
17 See also Velu, supra note 15 at 17, pointing out that this limitation was a result of a British
amendment to the Article, which was partially accepted.
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would amount to a violation of the law. This situation might arise, for
example, because there is no justification for that interference in terms of
consent of the targeted individual or the violation on regulations of
freedom of information gathering. The intention and focus of the
European Convention is unequivocally focused on controlling
impersonal governmental bureaucracies and precluding them from
unfettered 'Big-Brothering', not on private or commercial intrusions.18
At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights has
developed the concept of 'positive obligations', which turns the
obligation of the governmental authorities from one of merely refraining
from violating privacy rights into an active duty to protect those rights of
individuals. This, therefore, extends the protection to individuals against
private third parties.19
This is, however, only the status at the European level. In the case
of Mount Athos, clearly the Greek authorities protected the privacy of
the monasteries and surrounding areas over an individual's right of free
information gathering. However, that is indeed a matter to be decided
upon at the national level – other states might have decided differently
in comparable circumstances, either in terms of national laws or statutes,
or in terms of court decisions in case of actual disputes.
A further point of note concerns the scope of "everyone", as the
subject entitled to the rights of Article 8(1): does it include juridical
persons?20 Drafted so as to address natural persons only, originally
considerable uncertainty existed as to whether it could nevertheless be
interpreted to apply to juridical persons as well. However, with the 2002
Colas Est case, that question has been settled with an affirmative
answer.21 As such, companies, whose right to 'privacy' would be violated
by VHR satellite data, might – if falling otherwise within the scope of the
European Convention of course – base a relevant claim upon Article 8.
Finally, questions could still arise as to the scope of the notions of
'privacy' and 'interference' therewith, specifically also as to the role
satellite data could play in this context.
Prosser's Law of Torts, for example, lists four categories of relevant
18

See further also Velu, supra note 15 at 20-3, 87-91.
See Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 739-45.
20 See Velu, supra note 15 at 18-20.
21 Colas Est v. France (Application nr. 37971/97, Judgment of 16 April 2002).
19
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interference: (1) intrusion on plaintiff's privacy; (2) public disclosure of
private facts; (3) putting the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;
and, (4) appropriation of some elements of the plaintiff's personality for
the defendant's advantage.22
It seems that (1) and (2) would be at issue in the case of VHR
satellite data: those data could well intrude upon any privacy as long as
they concern open air activities, and could similarly be disclosed to the
public fairly easily. Many VHR satellite data applications are of a
commercial character, making their providers interested in spreading
them in principle as widely and as easily as possible. In addition, it could
be imagined that cases might fall within category (3), in particular when
satellite data might be tampered with.
In May 1967, considering the right to privacy, the Nordic
Conference of Jurists arrived at a wider definition as follows:23
The right of the individual to lead his own life protected against:
(a) Interference with his private, family and home life. (b)
Interference with his physical or mental integrity or his moral or
intellectual freedom. (c) Attacks on his honour and reputation. (d)
Being placed in a false light. (e) The disclosure of irrelevant,
embarrassing facts relating to his private life. (f) The use of his
name, identity or likeness. (g) Spying, prying, watching and
besetting. (h) Interference with his correspondence. (i) Misuse of
his private communications, written or oral. (j) Disclosure of
information given or received by him in circumstances of
professional confidence.
From the perspective of VHR satellite data, more or less similar to
the case of Prosser's abovementioned definition, categories (a) and (e)
clearly apply, at least in principle. In addition, category (g), absent as a
specific category in Prosser's definition, should be noted: this category
includes persistent watching of a person, photographing and filming,
eavesdropping and recording. Subject to limited exceptions relating to
consent of the targeted individual or any public nature or function in
which the target was active,24 this category would include cases where
22

As discussed in Velu, supra note 15 at 32-3.
As quoted in Velu, supra note 15 at 33.
24 See Velu, supra note 15 at 51-58. Exceptions regarding the target's consent, it may be
noted, may lead to additional problems of interpretation in the context of satellite data, as
in most cases the target will not be aware that a satellite is generating data of potential
particular concern to him.
23
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fundamental use is made of observation satellites.
As indicated above, no exhaustive authoritative list of activities,
scenarios or situations has been developed for the definition of 'private
life', the phrase within Article 8 most relevant in the context of VHR
satellite data. The closest to such a list came in the judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights in the Pretty case:25
As the Court has had previous occasion to remark, the concept of
"private life" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive
definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a
person . . . . It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's
physical and social identity . . . . Elements such as, for example,
gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life
fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 . . . . Article 8
also protects a right to personal development, and the right to
establish and develop relationships with other human beings and
the outside world . . . . Although no previous case has established
as such any right to self-determination as being contained in
Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion of
personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the
interpretation of its guarantees.
One authoritative expert text interprets this to mean that Article 8
contains "various guarantees to personal autonomy, personal privacy,
personal identity, personal integrity, personal development, personal
identification and similar concepts linked to the individual notion of
personhood".26
In any event, "the registration of personal data has been a vital
issue of the notion of privacy" – a conclusion of clear relevance for VHR
satellite data.27 The obligations under Article 8, however, seem to be
indeed directed largely to governmental authorities (such as in the
medical field), although sometimes private institutions of a specific noncommercial nature could also become involved.28
A second notion of potential relevance for activities involving
VHR satellite data concerns the respect for the home and protection
25

Pretty, supra note 16 at § 61.
Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 665.
27 Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 666; see also 667-79 for further analysis.
28 See also Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 667-77.
26
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against nuisance, which "also include those [violations of the right] that
are not concrete or physical, such as . . . other forms of interference".29
The right, in particular in VHR-data related circumstances, may actually
be difficult to distinguish from the right to private life.30 Still, it has
apparently not been made clear so far whether virtual interference with
the right, 'spying' as such (that is without further concrete nuisance
resulting from such spying, for example a publication on the web of the
VHR data concerned) would already constitute a violation of Article 8 of
the Convention.
Finally, it should be noted that the rights offered by Article 8 of the
European Convention are not unlimited.31 Specific limitations are
already offered by the Convention itself, referring to "time of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation",32 "the political
activity of aliens",33 as well as national security, public safety and other
exceptions explicitly provided for by Article 8.

III. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND PRIVACY:
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
In quite clear contrast to the Council of Europe and the European
Convention on Human Rights, the European Community ultimately
became involved in privacy protection issues from an economic
perspective. This is ultimately not surprising since the Community had
originated from the need for general economic integration of the member
states by means of regulation, even if the scope of involvement of the
European authorities and EC law has, over the decades, extended so as
to encompass many areas not of a (purely) economic nature.
It became apparent that the application of privacy protection could
often impact negatively upon economic activities.
Without trying to sum up the comprehensive legislative
development of the EC legal order here, it may be helpful to reiterate the
official aims of the European Community, then Union, as they were
defined by Article 2 of the EC Treaty,34 in order to assess the potential for
29

Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 719.
See also Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 723.
31 See especially Velu, supra note 15 at 66-87.
32 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 15(1).
33 European Convention on Human Rights, Art, 16.
34 The EC Treaty is essentially the original Treaty of Rome, or Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, Rome, done 25 March 1957, entered into force 1 January 1958; 298 UNTS
30
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privacy issues to come within the scope of that Treaty's regime. Such
aims and objectives include: the development of the EC economy; a high
level of employment and social protection; a high level of environmental
protection; the enhancement of the standard of living throughout the
member states; and the economic and social cohesion of the Community
and its member states.35
The consequence of an absence of a reference to 'privacy' in the EC
Treaty (or any other part of primary EC law) is that EC law only
interferes once privacy protection or, in a wider sense, privacy issues,
would have a certain negative impact on economic activities. If such a
negative impact is determined to exist, the EC authorities – the
Commission, the Parliament and the Council in a complicated interplay
of roles, responsibilities and competencies in the creation of EC law – can
come up with the necessary Regulations, Directives and/or Decisions to
curb such negative impacts. Such an Internal Market-perspective has
caused EC legislative activities over the decades to be particularly
focused on three areas.36
The first area concerns the realization of the so-called four
freedoms of cross-border movement: of goods (products),37 persons (as
far as they are involved in economic activities and, for that purpose,

11; as it was fundamentally amended by the Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, done 7
February 1992, entered into force 1 November 1993; 31 ILM 247 (1992); OJ C 191/1 (1992). The
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Amsterdam), Amsterdam,
done 2 October 1997, entered into force 1 May 1999; OJ C 340/73 (1997); then inter alia resulted
in a major renumbering exercise; the numbering of Articles in the present contribution is the
one following that renumbering. [EC Treaty].
35 Art. 2 EC, (that is in its version as per the Treaty of Amsterdam) reads in full: "The
Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and
monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in Articles
3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable
development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection,
equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree
of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection
and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living
and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member
States."
36 From an overarching perspective, a fourth area has traditionally been that of 'external
competence', i.e. the possibility at the European level to override individual member state
actions vis-à-vis third states, in terms of regulating or deregulating trade and other
economic relations with such third states. From the perspective of the current contribution,
however, this area does not need much attention at this point in time.
37 EC Treaty, Art. 23.
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interested in moving across intra-EU borders),38 services39 and capital.40
From a privacy perspective, the protection thereof could be seen to
potentially interfere with all four freedoms. From a remote sensing
perspective, it would largely depend on whether one considers remote
sensing and the provision of remote sensing information to be a service
or to be about delivery of a product (a dataset, for example).
In practice, where remote sensing is considered to amount to a
service, EC law may require EU member states to allow the providers of
such services, irrespective of their nationality, to offer them in their
respective territories on the same condition as home-grown providers
would do. Mutatis mutandis, if remote sensing is essentially about the
production of 'goods' such as datasets, then EC law might operate so as
to ensure the free movement of such goods across intra-EU borders. In
either case, it is not the activity in outer space or the production of
datasets as such which would be the subject of the Community's legal
attention, only downstream aspects within the Community itself. In
either case, also, it is in this context that EC law might also come to
interfere with the protection of privacy.
A second, much more focused area of EC law concerns what is
commonly referred to as the 'competition' or 'anti-trust' regime, the
essence of which is to try and ensure a level playing field for private
companies throughout the European Union by means of dedicated
instruments curbing anti-competitive behavior. These instruments are
basically of a twofold nature.
One set is addressed directly at private undertakings, for example
prohibiting market strategy coordination ('cartels' or 'collusive conduct'
as it is now labeled), to the extent that such coordination would have a
substantive negative effect on this EU-wide level playing field.41
Moreover, this set of rules seeks to outlaw the abuse of a dominant
position (such as a monopoly) that a particular private company may
have for anti-competitive purposes.42
The other set is addressed to member states, to the extent that they
might wish to provide state aid to (private) undertakings in order to
favor certain undertakings over others, and hence distort the proper
38

EC Treaty, Art. 39.
EC Treaty, Art. 49.
40 EC Treaty, Art. 56.
41 EC Treaty Art. 81.
42 EC Treaty Art. 82.
39
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functioning of the Internal Market.43
From the perspective of privacy, it could perhaps be expected that
as soon as laws or regulations enunciated by national authorities dealing
with the protection of personal data would result in a distortion of free
competition and the level playing field, such instruments of competition
law could be called upon to remedy that distortion. However, upon
closer view, this only plays at the level of national legislation of member
states. Thus, in reality, the envisaged Internal Market consists of various
national markets fenced off by major differences in levels of protection.
This brings us to the third area of EC law which seeks to address
privacy concerns: harmonization of national laws to make sure that both
private companies and private persons are provided or entitled to
roughly the same level of protection throughout the Union. In fact, a
considerable degree of legislation has been created under this heading to
address the matter.
From the EU perspective, the internal and fundamental objectives
of the European Union will necessarily lead to a substantial increase in
cross-border flows of personal data. The main issue underlying
legislative actions at the EC level with respect to the protection of data
for privacy protection purposes is that such data may, on the one hand,
become available to the public (which is in line with the general goals
and purposes of EU policies regarding free trade and open and fair
competition) but, on the other hand, they may interfere with the right to
privacy - which is also a general principle of law acknowledged and
respected in EC law. Thus, the legal discussion focuses on the balance
between free provision and movement of information on the one hand
and the protection privacy rights on the other.
As long as space-borne data are to be considered as data
impinging on a person's privacy, the main question for satellite remote
sensing is to what extent further generation, processing, handling and
distribution of those data that may result in public accessibility would be
lawful.

43

EC Treaty Art. 87.
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IV. THE BASELINE REGIME FOR THE EUROPEAN
UNION: THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE
A.

THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE: SCOPE, OBJECTIVES
AND DEFINITIONS

The first major result of the drive within the Community to
harmonize the national regimes regarding privacy and data protection
where the absence of such harmonization might interfere with the
proper functioning of the Internal Market was Directive 95/46/EC of
October 1995, also known as the Data Protection Directive.44 The
approach of this central piece of Community-legislation makes it clear
that the issues concerned are addressed very much from the traditional
EC-angle: "the Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal
data . . . in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of
Community law".45
The objectives of Directive 95/46 are, firstly, that EU member
states shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons, and in particular, their right to privacy with respect to the
processing of personal data.46 Secondly, member states shall neither
restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between member
states merely out of an interest to afford protection as envisaged under
the Directive's regime.47 In other words: privacy arguments may not be
(ab)used to distort the functioning of the EU Internal Market.
Currently, EU member states do not offer the same "level of
protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, notably the right to
privacy".48 This aspect may prevent "the transmission of personal data
from the territory of a Member State to that of another Member State"; a
difference which may "therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of a
number of economic activities at Community level, distort competition
and impede authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities under
Community law".49

44 EC, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 95/46/EC on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
[1995] O.J. L 281/31. [Directive 95/46].
45 Ibid., at Art. 3(2).
46 Ibid., at Art. 1(1).
47 Ibid., at Art. 1(2).
48 Ibid., at Recital 7.
49 Ibid., at Recital 7.
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The overarching aim of Directive 95/46 is thus to promote
equivalent levels of protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals
among member states. This allows safe cross-border flow of personal
data in parallel with equivalent and safe levels of protection of privacy
rights. Approximation of national laws is ensured in the Directive, but
member states are left some margin for maneuver, being able to specify
in their national law the general conditions governing the lawfulness of
data processing.
The principle of protection must be reflected in the obligations
imposed on persons, public authorities, enterprises, agencies or other
bodies responsible for processing, in particular regarding data quality,
technical security, notification to the supervisory authority, and the
circumstances under which processing can be carried out.
With a view to investigating to what extent satellite-derived data
might fall within the scope of the EC regime outlined above, reference
should be had next to the rather all-encompassing definitions of eight
key concepts and terms. These concepts concern the application of the
Directive, as well as that of further EC legal documents, as they indicate
the general approach and scope of the regime concerned.
These key concepts are defined as follows:50
(a) 'personal data' shall mean any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person hereinafter referred to as
'data subject'; an identifiable person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his or her physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity;
(b) 'processing of personal data' hereinafter referred to as
'processing' shall mean any operation or set of operations which is
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic
means, such as collection, recording, organisation, storage,
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available,
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction;
(c) 'personal data filing system' hereinafter referred to as 'filing
50 Ibid., at Art. 2. It may be noted that the exact same definitions reappear in one of the
follow-up EC-law documents; see EC Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
45/2001/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2001] O.J. L 8/1 at
Art. 2. [Regulation 45/2001].

826

ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW

VOL. XXXIV

system' shall mean any structured set of personal data which are
accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralised,
decentralised or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis;
(d) 'controller' shall mean the Community institution or body, the
Directorate-General, the unit or any other organisational entity
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and
means of processing are determined by a specific Community act,
the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be
designated by such Community act;
(e) 'processor' shall mean a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data
on behalf of the controller;
(f) 'third party' shall mean a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or body other than the data subject, the
controller, the processor and the persons who, under the direct
authority of the controller or the processor, are authorised to
process the data;
(g) 'recipient' shall mean a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body to whom data are disclosed,
whether a third party or not; however, authorities which may
receive data in the framework of a particular inquiry shall not be
regarded as recipients;
(h) 'the data subject's consent' shall mean any freely given specific
and informed indication of his or her wishes by which the data
subject signifies his or her agreement to personal data relating to
him or her being processed.
From a practical point of view, a provider of satellite-derived
products and/or services would be most analogous to the 'controller' or
the 'processor' under the Directive's terms. Such a controller or processor
can be any "natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other
body".51 The, generally speaking, broad definitions of 'personal data' and
'processing of personal data' leave ample room for VHR satellite data to
be included, and hence subjected to the regime of the Data Protection
Directive.
B.

THE
REQUIREMENTS
IMPOSED
BY
THE
PROTECTION DIRECTIVE ON DATA HANDLING

DATA

The Directive thus envisages data in a very wide sense. Given the
51

Directive 95/46, Art. 2(d).
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developments under way, in the framework of the information society,
of increasingly refined techniques used to capture, transmit, manipulate,
record, store or communicate sounds and image data relating to natural
persons, the Directive should be applicable in principle to any processing
activities involving any such satellite data. The Directive shall therefore
also apply to any processing of remote sensing data, whether automatic
or in order to form part of a filing system, as long as a service provider
can access the positioning and navigation data. However, such
processing is then subjected to a number of requirements in order to be
lawful under the Directive:52 personal data must be:
!
!

!

!

!

processed fairly and lawfully;
collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and
not further processed in a way incompatible with those
purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical
or scientific purposes shall not be considered as
incompatible provided that member states provide
appropriate safeguards;
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are collected and/or further
processed;
accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are
inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for
which they were collected or for which they are further
processed, are erased or rectified;
kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects
for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which
the data were collected or for which they are further
processed. Member states shall lay down appropriate
safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for
historical, statistical or scientific use."

In addition:53
Personal data may be processed only if:
!
the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or
!
processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to
which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at
the request of the data subject prior to entering into a
52
53

Ibid., at Art. 6(2).
Ibid., at Art. 7.

828

ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW

!
!
!

!

VOL. XXXIV

contract; or
processing is necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation to which the controller is subject; or
processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests
of the data subject; or
processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried
out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority vested in the controller or in a third party to
whom the data are disclosed; or
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or
parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject which require
protection under Article 1(1).

Additionally, a distinction is provided between cases of collection
of data from the data subject, dealt with by Article 10, and cases where
the data have not been obtained from the data subject, which is usually
the relevant scenario for satellite data, especially if the satellite data is
not enhanced, validated and/or verified by terrestrial data and
information collection. In such cases:54
the controller or his representative must at the time of undertaking
the recording of personal data or if a disclosure to a third party is
envisaged, no later than the time when the data are first disclosed
provide the data subject with at least the following information,
except where he already has it:
1. the identity of the controller and of his representative, if
any;
2. the purposes of the processing;
3. any further information such as
! the categories of data concerned,
! the recipients or categories of recipients,
! the existence of the right of access to and the
right to rectify the data concerning him
in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to
the specific circumstances in which the data are processed, to
guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject.
Further clauses then deal with the actual security of processing
54

Ibid., at Art. 11(1).
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personal data with potentially privacy-sensitive impacts, such as the
implementation of appropriate technical and organizational measures to
protect the data against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental
loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, and against all other
unlawful forms of processing. Moreover, it establishes an obligation for
the data controller to provide sufficient guarantees in respect of such
technical security measures and organizational measures governing the
processing to be carried out, and to ensure compliance with those
measures.55
Furthermore, when a processor is involved, the activities should
be regulated by a contract or legal act binding the processor to the
controller, stipulating in particular that:
the processor shall act only on instructions from the controller, and
relevant obligations, as defined by the law of the EU member state
in which the processor is established, shall also be incumbent on
the processor'.56
The Directive applies to "the processing of personal data wholly or
partly by automatic means and to the processing otherwise than by
automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or
are intended to form part of a filing system".57 This is done "so as to
permit easy access to the personal data in question".58
However, there are a few exceptions limiting such comprehensive
application. Directive 95/46 provides for some prohibited categories of
data processing, listed as covering "data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life".59
Satellite data somehow giving away someone's position are not included
in this list merely for that reason, generally speaking, VHR satellite data
will not fall within the above prohibited categories.
One further relevant exception here concerns data processing for
statistical, historical or scientific purposes.60 Such data are offered no
protection under the Directive in terms of limiting or prohibiting access
55

Ibid., at Art. 17(1) & (2).
Ibid., at Art. 17(3).
57 Ibid., at Art. 3(1).
58 Ibid., at Recital 15.
59 Ibid., at Art. 8(1).
60 Ibid., at Art. 11(2).
56
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to them, subject to some guarantees ensuring a proper and balanced
application of this clause.
Furthermore, according to its own terms, "the Directive shall not
apply to the processing of personal data . . . in the course of an activity
which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided
for by Title V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to
processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security
(including the economic well-being of the State when the processing
operation related to State security matters) and the activities of the State
in areas of criminal law", by a natural person in the course of a purely
personal or household activity.61 Such data does not enjoy the protection
offered by the Directive either.
These exceptions for public security, defence, state security and
criminal law-related activities are noteworthy as they provide a major
caveat to the application of the Directive's regime to the remote sensing
environment. Thus, for example, the processing of satellite data, even if
'personal' in the sense of the Data Protection Directive, does not fall
within the scope of the Directive where such processing relates to state
security matters.
This exception may have a particular impact on VHR satellite data
processing as many such data will result from activities conducted for
purposes of public safety, defence or state security. This, obviously,
would have to be clearly indicated, and this clause ought to be
interpreted in a manner which avoids abuse of its potential application.
To be precise however, the consequence of this provision is not
that no restrictions protecting privacy interests apply in this context, but
rather that all and any such restrictions are still basically imposed by
national legislation and for domestic purposes (and at a more general
level by international and European human rights law).
Thus, Directive 95/46 provides the baseline regime for dealing
with privacy issues within the European Union and its EC law
framework. The Directive itself directly refers to the relevant internal
and fundamental objectives of the European Union:62
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,
61
62

Ibid., at Art. 3(2).
Ibid., at Recital 1.
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fostering closer relations between the States belonging to the
Community, ensuring economic and social progress by common
action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, encouraging
the constant improvement of the living conditions of its peoples,
preserving and strengthening peace and liberty and promoting
democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognised in the
constitution and laws of the Member States and in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
That baseline was soon seen to require specific elaboration in three
particular areas: (1) where EU institutions themselves would come to
play a key role in the process of data generation, gathering, processing
and/or dissemination; (2) to the extent telecommunications
infrastructure would present the logical means for distribution and
dissemination also of satellite data with potential privacy-sensitive
effects; and (3) the extent to which the substance of the EC law regime
could and/or should be effectively transported outside the Union in
order to protect the interests of the whole legal framework within the
Union.

V.

THE
ELABORATIONS:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
EFFECTS

EU
INSTITUTIONS,
AND
EXTRA-EU

A.

REGULATION 45/2001 – EU INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN
DATA HANDLING

Regulation 45/200163 essentially applies, and where necessary
adapts, the regime of Directive 95/46 to the main organs and bodies of
the European Community and European Union itself. Thus, its scope is
to "provide the individual with legally enforceable rights to specify the
data processing obligations of the controllers within the Community
institutions and bodies and to create an independent supervisory
authority responsible for monitoring the processing of personal data by
the Community institutions and bodies".64
The role and responsibilities of the controller as determined by
Directive 95/46 shall therefore, as a consequence of Regulation 45/2001,
also apply to EU institutions and bodies. The "controller shall mean the
63
64

Regulation 45/2001, supra note 51.
Ibid., at Recital 5.
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Community institution or body, the Directorate-General, the unit or any
other organizational entity which alone or jointly with others determines
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the
purposes and means of processing are determined by a specific
Community act, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination
may be designated by such Community act".65
The most important difference to Directive 95/46 is embodied in
the clauses on the lawfulness of processing, making data processing
legitimate only as far as:66
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest on the basis of the Treaties establishing the European
Communities or other legal instruments adopted on the basis
thereof or in the legitimate exercise of official authority vested in
the Community institution or body or in a third party to whom the
data are disclosed, or . . . necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation to which the controller is subject, or to take steps at the
request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract, or
[when] the data subject has unambiguously given his or her
consent, or . . . necessary in order to protect the vital interests of
the data subject.
Transfer of personal data – whether within or between EU
institutions or bodies, or to recipients, other than EU institutions or
bodies, subject to Directive 95/46, or to recipients, other than EU
institutions or bodies, which are not subject to Directive 95/46 – in
principle shall be legitimate as long as carried out in the public interest.
While prima facie it is unlikely that EU institutions would be
crucially involved in data handling operations themselves, the recent
arrival on the space scene of the Global Monitoring for Environment and
Security initiative (GMES) (recently re-christened Kopernikus) may
change that very soon.
In November 2001, an EU Council Resolution called for the
European Commission to coordinate with ESA to develop "an
operational and autonomous European capability for global monitoring
for environment and security" by 2008, crucially involving a satellite

65
66

Ibid., at Art. 2(d).
Ibid., at Art. 5,
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system.67 This capability was to result in an infrastructure of
interoperability, with standardized databases being filled with relevant
data. These data would be partly self-generated by the key GMES
players, notably ESA and EUMETSAT, with EUMETSAT being
considered another major stakeholder even though not, to date, an
'official' partner in the project.
However, the details of the institutional and governance structure
to be established at the core of the GMES/Kopernikus initiative remain
subject to discussion. At some point the establishment of a core entity,
provisionally labeled 'GMES Authority', must be envisaged. The extent
to which existing legal rules on privacy protection under Regulation
45/2001 would apply in the GMES/Kopernikus context depends to a
considerable extent on the legal character and personality of such a
GMES Authority (or similar body or bodies). A number of options have
already entered the debate on this issue, generally referring to various
types of bodies or organs that can be established under EC law such as a
Joint Undertaking,68 an Executive Agency,69 a Community Agency70 or a
Joint Technology Initiative (JTI).71
67

EC, Council Resolution on the launch of the initial period of global monitoring for
environment and security (GMES) [2001] O.J. C 350/4 at para (3). See further EC,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council –
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): Establishing a GMES capacity by
2008, [2004] COM(2004) 65;. See e.g. Frans G. von der Dunk, 'The 'S' of 'Security': Europe on
the Road to GMES' (2007) 4-2 Soochow Law Journal at 1.
68 EC Treaty Art. 171. See e.g. Communication of 3 February 2004, 17. The example usually
referred to, of course, is the Galileo Joint Undertaking that paved the way for the Galileo
development, deployment and operational phases.
69 EC, Council Regulation 58/2003/EC laying down the status for executive agencies to be
entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes [2002] O.J. L
11/1; See also EC, Commission Decision 2004/20/EC setting up an executive agency, the
'Intelligent Energy Executive Agency', to manage Community action in the field of energy
in application of Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 [2004] O.J. L 5/85; EC, Commission
Decision 2004/858/EC setting up an executive agency, the 'Executive Agency for the Public
Health Programme', for the management of Community action in the field of public health
– pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003, [2004] O.J. L 369/73.
70 See e.g. European Environment Agency (EEA), established by EC, Council Regulation
1210/90/EEC on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and the
European Environment Information and Observation Network, [1990] O.J. L 120/1;
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), established by Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council 1592/2002/EC on common rules in the field of civil aviation
and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, [2002] O.J. L 240/1; European
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), established by Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council 1406/2002/EC establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, [2002]
O.J. L 208/1.
71 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament –
European Space Policy – Preliminary Elements, SEC(2005)664, Brussels, 23 May 2005,
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Whilst other options – such as creating an altogether new
intergovernmental organization for the purpose – have also been
considered, the aforementioned options would utilize an EU institution
and, therefore, the regime developed under Regulation 45/2001 would
impact upon Kopernikus' activities to that extent.
Without having formally clarified the issue, more recent legal
documents on GMES/Kopernikus have only fuelled the expectation that
the future key players in the initiative and the institutional framework to
be established for it would include one or more EU institutions. For
instance, the Communication of 10 November 2005, aptly entitled 'From
Concept to Reality',72 starts by reiterating the general thrust of the GMES
project. Thus, it states: "the need for reliable and timely information has
been underlined by increased demand. Natural and manmade
catastrophes in Europe, America, Asia and Africa, coupled with
increased security needs, have further reinforced the case for improved
monitoring systems. Global to local levels of requirements have now
been identified".73
GMES/Kopernikus is thus tasked to support a range of EU
policies, and the Communication refers specifically to concrete examples
like the Union's involvement in agriculture, environmental and fisheries
monitoring, external relations such as in case of disaster and emergency
response action, and development policies.74 The Communication further
determines the way forward by means of defining the concepts of 'pilot
operational services' and 'Fast Track introduction'.75
COM(2005) 208 final.
72 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament –
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): From Concept to Reality,
COM(2005) 565 final, of 10 November 2005. [Concept to Reality]. Whilst the GMES website
makes reference to a further Decision of the Commission of 8 March 2006, pertaining to the
establishment of a core team on GMES labelled the 'GMES Bureau', at the time of this
writing it has not been possible to locate and access that Decision; see online:
<http://www.gmes.info/72.0.html>. accessed 28 July 2008, last updated 17 November
2006.
73 Concept to Reality, ibid., at 5.
74 Ibid., at, 6-7.
75 The focus on institutional users, notably EU institutions and national governments, as
potential output receivers, is further reflected in the membership of the various groups
established to develop the three fast track services. The Emergency Response Core Service
(ERCS) Implementation Group thus comprises the Italian Civil Protection agency
representing national EU member states' civil protection agencies, the Commission's DG's
on Environment and External Relations respectively, the Commission's Humanitarian Aid
Office (ECHO) and the fire rescue service of the Czech Republic representing the civil
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The key role of GMES/Kopernikus in supporting EU policies, the
involvement of many Commission Directorates-General in the pilot
operational services and the general political leading role of the
Commission in the effort makes it likely that an EU institution will
function as a key entity within the operational framework for GMES.
Moreover, the same and/or other EU institutions will also be playing
important roles in downstream dissemination, which is where – in the
case of VHR satellite data at least – privacy issues may start to arise. As
such, an EU institution or body would qualify as a 'GMES data
controller'.
Thus, the legal regime developed on the basis of the Data
Protection Directive and further elaborated for this special case by
Regulation 45/2001 would mean, in the context of GMES, that transfer of
personal data for commercial purposes may not be possible.
B.

DIRECTIVES 97/66 AND 2002/58 – TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INVOLVED IN DATA HANDLING

In view of the key role telecommunication services and
infrastructure play in today's issues of privacy and privacy-sensitive
access to data, a special set of EC law instruments have been developed
for the purpose. In this context, the first such instrument that dealt with
the issue, Directive 97/66,76 focused on the processing of personal data
and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector in a
rather comprehensive fashion. Given the prominent use of
telecommunications infrastructure for the dissemination and distribution
of satellite remote sensing data, this instrument of EC law is particularly
relevant for the current analysis.
protection agencies in new EU member states; see online:
<http://www.gmes.info/168.0.html>. accessed 28 July 2008. The Land Monitoring Core
Service (LMCS) Implementation Group likewise comprises the German national mapping
agency, the Hungarian Institute of Geodesy, representing user communities in new EU
member states, the European Topic Centre on Terrestrial Environment, the European
Environmental Agency, and the Commission's DG's on Regional Policy respectively
Agriculture and Rural Development; see online: <http://www.gmes.info/167.0.html>.
accessed 28 July 2008. The Marine Core Service (MCS) Implementation Group finally
comprises the European Association for the Global Ocean Observing System 'EuroGOOS',
European Meteorological Offices, the Marine Board of the European Science Foundation,
the Commission's Maritime Policy Task Force, the European Environment Agency, the
European Maritime Safety Agency and the Commission's DG on External Relations; see
online: <http://www.gmes.info/169.0.html>. accessed 28 July 2008.
76 EC, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 97/66/EC concerning the processing
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector, [1998] O.J. L 24/1.
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The aim and objective of Directive 97/66 was to create rules that
were technology-neutral, that is, they were not to dictate or discriminate
in favor of the use of a particular type of technology. Rather, they ought
to ensure that the same service is regulated in an equivalent manner
irrespective of the means by which it is delivered. Directive 2002/5877
was then drafted to replace Directive 97/66 concerning the processing of
personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications
sector in order to adapt and update the existing provisions to new and
foreseeable developments in electronic communications services and
technologies, notably of ICT (information and computer technology)
convergence.
Thus, Directive 2002/58 provides for the harmonization of the
provisions of the member states, who are required to ensure an
equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms within
the EU, and in particular the right to privacy, with respect to the
processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector and
to ensure the free movement of such data and electronic communications
equipment and services within the European Union.78 The Directive
applies to the processing of personal data specifically in connection with
the provision of publicly available electronic communications services in
public communications networks. It seeks to provide suitable measures
for adaptation of previous EC legal measures to developments in the
markets and technologies for electronic communications services. It does
this in order to provide an equal level of protection of personal data and
privacy for users of publicly available electronic communications
services, regardless of the technologies used.
The existing definitions of 'telecommunications services and
networks' under Directive 97/66 were subsequently replaced in
Directive 2002/58 by the definition 'electronic communications services
and networks' under Article 2. This is to ensure that all different types of
transmission services for electronic communications will be covered
regardless of the technology used, and essentially in the same,
technology-neutral fashion.
Moreover, four new definitions were added, of "calls",
"communication", "traffic data", and "location data" respectively, to
77 EC, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2002/58/EC concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector,
[2002] O.J. L 201/37. [Directive 2002/58].,
78 Ibid., at Art. 1(1) & (2).
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strengthen the common understanding of these terms and thereby
improve the harmonized implementation of the relevant articles
throughout the European Union.79
The provisions of these Directives thereby particularize and
complement Directive 95/46 for the purposes of the "processing of
personal data in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services in public communications networks
in the Community".80 Also, these provisions provide for the protection of
legitimate interests of legal persons: Directive 2002/58 considers legal
persons to be persons whose interests can and should indeed be
legitimately protected.
Confidentiality of communications including the relevant traffic
data and the prohibition of tapping or other forms of surveillance by
third parties are also guaranteed:81
(1) Member States shall ensure the confidentiality of
communications and the related traffic data by means of a public
communications network and publicly available electronic
communications services, through national legislation. In
particular, they shall prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other
kinds of interception or surveillance of communications and the
related traffic data by persons other than users, without the
consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorised to
do so in accordance with Article 15(1). This paragraph shall not
prevent technical storage which is necessary for the conveyance of
a communication without prejudice to the principle of
confidentiality.
(2) Paragraph 1 shall not affect any legally authorised recording of
communications and the related traffic data when carried out in
the course of lawful business practice for the purpose of providing
evidence of a commercial transaction or of any other business
communication.
As it is very important for data subjects to be fully informed about
the type of data which are being processed and the purposes for which
this is done, an explicit obligation is imposed by the Directive to inform

79

Ibid., at Art. 2(e), (d), (b) & (c).
Ibid., at Art. 3(1).
81 Ibid., at Art. 5,
80
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subscribers of the data which are being collected.82 This empowers
subscribers to any service involving substantial data generation and
handling to control and, where necessary, object to ongoing data
processing.
The impending arrival of Europe's second-generation satellite
timing, positioning and navigation system Galileo on the European scene
has caused necessary amendments to the existing regime.83 Not only is
this of interest to GMES/Kopernikus given the potential for satellite
positioning information to enhance the precision and value of GMES
data, it has also caused the EC to enact a new article on location data
other than traffic within Directive 2002/58. It stipulates that such data:84
may only be processed when they are made anonymous, or with
the consent of the users or subscribers to the extent and for the
duration necessary for the provision of a value added service. The
service provider must inform the users or subscribers, prior to
obtaining their consent, of the type of location data other than
traffic data which will be processed, of the purposes and duration
of the processing and whether the data will be transmitted to a
third party for the purpose of providing the value added service.
Users or subscribers shall be given the possibility to withdraw
their consent for the processing of location data other than traffic
data at any time.
The only exceptions to the principle of prior consent would be the
use of location data by emergency services as well as the existing
derogation for EU member states for the purposes of public and national
security and criminal investigations. For these purposes a reference is
included in Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58 to allow member states to
restrict the of use location data where this is necessary and
proportionate.
Lastly, the Directive provides for clauses on technical features and
standardization, guaranteeing that data protection considerations may
not lead to trade and service barriers within the EU Internal Market for
82

Ibid., at Art. 6(4).
See e.g. Frans G. von der Dunk, "Towards Monitoring Galileo: the European GNSS
Supervisory Authority" in statu nascendi, (2006) 55 Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht
100; See also Frans. G von der Dunk "Hosting Galileo Ground Stations – Liability and
Responsibility Issues under Space Law" in Proceedings of the Fiftieth Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space (2008) 358.
84 Directive 2002/58, supra note 78 at Art. 9(1).
83
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terminal equipment and software and ensures that any mandatory
requirements on terminal equipment and software to protect personal
data and privacy may only be imposed through EC procedures.85
Exceptions to the application of the general regime of Directive
95/46 remain possible, however. EU member states may restrict
provisions of the Directive to safeguard public security and conduct
criminal investigations. Moreover, such exceptions extend to situations
"when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and
proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national
security (i.e., State security), defence, public security, and the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of
unauthorized use of the electronic communication system, as referred to
in Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC".86 Again, the relevance for
satellite remote sensing activities, in particular GMES / Kopernikus, will
be clear.
Finally, Article 1(3) of Directive 2002/58 provides for the same
exceptions as Directive 95/46 regarding Title V and VI of the Treaty of
the European Union, regarding public and national security and criminal
investigations. The Directive provides for very specific obligations here,
inter alia imposing responsibility for the security of services and
networks on providers and obliges them to inform subscribers in case of
residual security risks:87
(1) The provider of a publicly available electronic communications
service must take appropriate technical and organisational
measures to safeguard security of its services, if necessary in
conjunction with the provider of the public communications
network with respect to network security. Having regard to the
state of the art and the cost of their implementation, these
measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk
presented.
(2) In case of a particular risk of a breach of the security of the
network, the provider of a publicly available electronic
communications service must inform the subscribers concerning
such risk and, where the risk lies outside the scope of the measures
to be taken by the service provider, of any possible remedies,
including an indication of the likely costs involved.
85

Ibid., at Art. 14.
Ibid., at Art. 15(1).
87 Ibid., at Art. 4.
86
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In sum, such general obligations pertaining to the use of
telecommunication infrastructure under Directive 2002/58 with a view
to privacy issues will also have a fundamental impact on VHR satellite
data downstream services and activities, in view of the almost inherent
need for the latter to make use of such infrastructure.
C.

DECISIONS 2001/497 AND 2002/16 – EXTRA-EU EFFECTS OF
DATA HANDLING

The extent to which personal data is protected outside the
European Union, whether for privacy purposes or for other purposes, is
fundamentally a matter for national legislation of the states where such
protection is desired; obviously, the EU institutions cannot determine
any applicable principles and rules outside the territories of the EU
member states.
Nevertheless, the European Union has the competencies to deal
with such issues to the extent that EU entities and companies, including
notably a GMES Authority for Kopernikus, are involved in such
dealings. Two Decisions of the European Commission are relevant in this
respect: Decision 2001/497 on standard contractual clauses for the
transfer of personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46,88 and
Decision 2002/16 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of
personal data to processors established in third countries, under
Directive 95/46.89
Since most satellite remote sensing activities have a tendency of
being of global effect, scope and application, EC law such as the
aforementioned Decisions relating to data protection will apply even for
data transfers outside Europe, as long as the data processing itself is
performed under the jurisdictions of one or more EU member states.
For any satellite-data-based activities downstream of any
European satellite operator and/or GMES Authority in these states the
regime of Directive 95/46 continues to apply, mutatis mutandis. To the
extent that such operators have the legal nationality of (that is place of
incorporation and headquarters in) an EU member state, or operate from
88

EC, Commission Decision 497/2001/EC on standard contractual clauses for the transfer
of personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC, [2001] O.J. L 181/19.
89 EC, Commission Decision 16/2002/EC on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of
personal data to processors established in third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC,
[2002] O.J. L 6/52.
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EU member state territory, they would be equally bound by such rules.
The same applies to any satellite remote sensing data and/or service
provider operating in the EU markets. This is the case even if the
provider is non-EU in origin and conducting their operations basically
from outside the European Union, regardless of whether they use data
derived from European satellites or not. The aim must ultimately be to
maintain a level playing field within the European Union.
If, however, non-EU companies not operating from EU territory
would become customers for European satellite-derived data or
customers for services so as to incorporate these the services the non-EU
companies perform outside EU territory, relevant entities would have a
'flow-down' duty to ensure that it will in no way contribute thereby to
circumvention of this EU regime.
To this extent, the effects of the EC law regime discussed could be
labeled as 'extra-territorial'. Obviously, if in such a case a non-EU
customer would obtain data without any involvement of European
satellite products or services, and handle them differently from that
which would be allowed under the EU regime, there is – legally
speaking – little either the GMES Authority or the Commission or even
the EU member states could do about it. However, the burden of proof
that the relevant authority was not able to prevent that from happening
would lie with the authority – the GMES Authority in case of
Kopernikus, the Commission and/or individual EU member states, as
applicable. Of course, any such event may lead to undesirable political
fall-out.
The extent to which this general legal framework will in practice
affect European VHR satellite data operations and downstream activities
can of course only be determined in fairly general terms, noting that
even in the context of GMES / Kopernikus major uncertainties regarding
the structural framework for operations and downstream activities still
exist.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Comparing the two 'European approaches', it is clear that they
come from rather different points of departure; and stay true to those.
On the one hand, there is the legal framework developed under the
auspices of the Council of Europe which views privacy as a rather
fundamental human right, to be protected against all undue interference,
including commercial ones. On the other hand, the law developed within
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the European Community starts out from a commercial vantage point
and tries to ensure that a level playing field with open borders exists also
in areas where privacy concerns may come to obstruct or limit access to
data, including VHR satellite data.
Aggravating the potential conflict between those two approaches,
the two international organizations have a different set of states as
members; the Council of Europe counting 47 member states altogether,
the European Union counting 27.
Nonetheless, such potential conflicts are mitigated firstly by the
fact that all EU member states are members of the Council of Europe.
Secondly, even where divergence between the Council of Europemember states not members of the Union and those that are members of
the Union may arise, it should be pointed out that the Community itself
and its institutions are committed to upholding the obligations imposed
by the European Convention on Human Rights. As such, EC law is to
respect and, where required, even incorporate the core substance of the
Convention's system of human rights protection into its day to day
influence within 'Europe'.90
Therefore, within the context of EC law, the protection of the
individual constitutes the principle whereas the free flow of information,
deemed necessary for optimal economic and commercial development,
constitutes the exception. This is clearly contrary to its official
relationship being the other way round. The undue obstruction of the
Internal Market and furtherance of commercial activities on a level
playing field remain the primary focus of EC law, leading to
harmonization efforts such as those discussed above. Yet, ultimately, the
European approach to privacy issues in terms of data is based on the
protection of the individual as the most fundamental parameter.
This general conclusion obviously also includes satellite remote
sensing data, whether under the European Convention on Human
Rights or in the framework of EC law. Of particular interest in this
respect is the GMES/Kopernikus initiative, which is to be not only
a(nother) flagship of European cooperation in space, with the
Commission as the political driving factor and ESA as the technical
coordinator, but may also give rise to an enormous boost of satellite data
and related activities downstream, as regards a variety of applications
90 Cf. Art. 6(1), in particular (2), Treaty on European Union; also e.g. R.P. Folsom, Principles of
European Union Law, (St. Paul: Thomson West, 2005) 57-59.
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and services. In this sense, GMES/Kopernikus may well act as a catalyst
also for increasing private activities at the level of generation of data by
satellites, further to greater involvement in the downstream areas. If
VHR satellite data are, indeed, going to be a major element in this
development, then ever more privacy issues will rear their heads,
whether at the individual or at the company level.
What does the above analysis, finally, mean for Athos and our
German businessman? At this point in time, the international freedom to
undertake satellite remote sensing activities, which was at the basis of
the latter's interest, is (still) relatively undisputed. However, with the
increasing advent of VHR satellite data on the scene, especially as part of
the broader context of Google Earth's adventures and (other)
Geographical Information Systems, it cannot be excluded that also on the
international level consensus would increasingly be called for by at least
some major stakeholders that the unfettered usage of space-borne data
should be curbed. And whilst on the larger political level limitations to
freedom of information-gathering will continue to be strongly resisted
by the major space-faring nations, when it comes to the privacy of
individuals and companies the outcome of such a discussion might not
be a foregone conclusion.
At the other end, the Greek authorities will, for the time being,
continue to be able to use their sovereign rights even within the context
of EC law for the protection of the interests of Athos, as they did vis-à-vis
the German businessman. The current exceptions to the application of
unfettered free-commerce regulations, within the current set of relevant
EC instruments, leave ample room for that. Indeed, as long as the Greek
authorities refrain from discrimination in allowing a local businessman
to do what the German one was not allowed to do, there is little chance
this would change.
The only option left to the German businessman, therefore, would
be to offer his satellite pictures to those interested who are outside the
reach of Greek sovereign jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it would be prudent
of him to ensure that any authorities dealing with such a matter would
not support the Greek view and uphold relevant obstacles within their
jurisdiction as well. Whether that leaves enough of a business case to be
still of interest to him is another matter; any potential intrusion into the
holy atmosphere at Athos will be removed far enough from the scene
itself to justify limiting the internationally recognized freedom of
information gathering for the purpose.
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Even though such an outcome is the result of a perhaps an
unnecessarily complicated construction – the alignment of two European
approaches, on top of the international and national regimes relevant for
privacy issues stemming from the usage of VHR satellite data – it does
reflect the general European attitude that a fair balance has to be struck
between commercial opportunities and the individual's rights to privacy.
In other words, the alignment of these two European approaches has
caused the international regime, which enshrines the freedom of space
activities such as information gathering by satellite, to meet any given
particular national regime in the middle. National sovereignty it
therefore utilized for the purpose of preserving 'privacy'.

